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REVISITING ASBESTOS-CONTAMINANT 
EXPOSURE, REGULATION, AND 
RECKONING: WHEN DEATH IS IN THE AIR 
Bianca Forde* 
Abstract: Amphibole and tremolite are related forms of contaminant as-
bestos that are extremely toxic in nature. However, the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) has not specifically listed these asbesti-
forms in the Clean Air Act (CAA) or its implementing regulations 
because they are not commercially produced. This exclusion is difficult to 
justify in light of the well-established link between exposure to these con-
taminants and asbestos-related disease. This Note discusses the regulatory 
loophole created by the current CAA regulatory scheme and uses the 
pending criminal action against W.R. Grace & Company to expose the 
need for regulations in this area. This Note calls for EPA to promulgate 
explicit regulations on contaminant-asbestos. Absent regulatory action, 
this Note urges courts to interpret the CAA in accordance with congres-
sional intent to ensure that the knowing emission of hazardous pollutants 
does not go unpunished. 
Introduction 
 In November 1999, media reports documenting asbestos contami-
nation in Libby, Montana prompted a U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) investigation.1 The investigation revealed that the asbes-
tos contamination in Libby presented an imminent threat to public 
health.2 EPA linked the contamination to a vermiculite mining plant 
previously owned and operated by W.R. Grace & Company (Grace), 
and experts projected that clean-up costs would approach $179 million 
                                                                                                                      
* Clinical Program Director, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2007–08. 
1 Libby Asbestos—US EPA Region 8, http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/libby 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Libby Asbestos]. 
2 Indictment at 423, United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. CR 05-07-M-DWM (D. Mont. 
Feb. 7, 2005), appeal docketed, Nos. 06-30472, 06-30524 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2006) [hereinafter 
Indictment]. 
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by 2007.3 By February 2005, the date Grace was indicted, at least 1200 
Libby residents suffered from “asbestos related pleural abnormalities” 
caused by exposure to Grace’s facility.4 
 Criminal charges are now pending against Grace for knowing en-
dangerment violations of the Clean Air Act (CAA), as well as obstruc-
tion of justice and wire fraud.5 Grace’s operation of the Libby Mine 
from 1963 through 1992 resulted in nationwide distribution of asbestos-
contaminated ore and products to manufacturing plants, schools, and 
other facilities.6 Additionally, tests as early as 1969 revealed that Grace’s 
operations emitted 5000 pounds of asbestos daily.7 The health effects of 
this large-scale business activity continue to this day.8 
 This Note discusses Grace’s involvement in Libby, Montana, and 
uses the Libby litigation as a backdrop for analyzing how EPA’s failure 
to specifically name certain asbestiforms in the CAA has lead to an 
ineffective regulatory regime, as well as injustice. Part I lays out 
Grace’s environmentally egregious actions in Libby, Montana, empha-
sizing Grace’s knowledge that the Libby vermiculite contained asbes-
tos. Part II provides an overview of the CAA and its criminal provi-
sions. Part III discusses asbestos’s place in the CAA regulatory scheme 
and explains the distinction between commercially and noncommer-
                                                                                                                      
3 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Hazardous Materials: EPA’s Cleanup of Asbes-
tos in Libby, Montana, and Related Actions to Address Asbestos-Contaminated 
Materials 9 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03469.pdf. 
4 Indictment, supra note 2, at 427. 
5 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, W.R. Grace and Executives Charged with Fraud, 
Obstruction of Justice, and Endangering Libby, Montana Community (Feb. 7, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/February/05_enrd_048.htm; see also Brief of 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 12, United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., Nos. 06-30472, 06-30524 (9th 
Cir. Jan., 2004) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant]; Appellees’ Joint Response Brief 1–4, 
United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., Nos. 06-30472, 06-30524 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2007) [here-
inafter Appellees’ Joint Response Brief]. A federal grand jury indicted Grace and seven of 
its upper-level managers for their alleged environmental misconduct in February 2005. 
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra. 
6 See EPA, Research Method for Sampling and Analysis of Fibrous Amphibole in 
Vermiculite Insulation 3 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/asbestos/pubs/vaire- 
searchmethodfinal.pdf [hereinafter Research Method]. “Prior to 1990, a large propor-
tion of the U.S. consumption of vermiculite originated from the mine at Libby, Montana.” 
Id. 
7 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, EPA May Need to Reassess Sites Receiving 
Asbestos-Contaminated Ore from Libby, Montana and Should Improve Its Public 
Notification Process 5 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0871.pdf; 
Andrew Schneider, A Town Left to Die, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 18, 1999, at A4, 
available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/uncivilaction/lib18.shtml [hereinafter Schnei-
der, Left to Die]. 
8 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that “more victims are expected to 
be discovered in the years to come”). 
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cially produced asbestos, noting EPA’s failure to regulate the latter. 
Part IV discusses the criminal proceedings against Grace, focusing on 
preliminary rulings that illustrate the practical effect of EPA’s regula-
tory failure. Finally, Part V looks to why regulation of asbestos con-
taminants through the CAA is essential, regardless of whether an in-
cident like that in Libby is likely to be repeated. 
I. The Libby Debacle 
A. The Early Stages of Vermiculite Mining in Libby 
 Vermiculite describes the group of minerals formed when silicate 
minerals are exposed to groundwater.9 When heated at temperatures 
between 800 and 1100 degrees centigrade, vermiculite minerals ac-
quire properties that are useful for fire proofing, insulation, and fer-
tilizing products.10 Although the vermiculite found in the Libby mine 
possesses these properties, it is contaminated by rare and toxic forms 
of asbestos varieties known as amphibole and tremolite.11 These min-
erals are extremely dangerous once airborne.12 As such, the Libby as-
bestos did not pose a substantial health threat until vermiculite min-
ing activities began.13 
 Gold miners discovered the Libby vermiculite in the late 1800s.14 
Experiments subsequently revealed that the ore had substantial com-
mercial value.15 Thus, mining began in 1939 under the control of the 
                                                                                                                      
9 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Health Consultation 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/asbestos/sites/health_consultations/pdf/FormerZonoliteStLouis 
HC081606.pdf. 
10 Indictment, supra note 2, at 418; U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., supra note 
9, at 3. 
11 Indictment, supra note 2, at 418. 
12 See EPA, Amphibole Mineral Fibers in Source Materials in Residential and 
Commercial Areas of Libby Pose an Imminent and Substantial Endangerment to 
Public Health 1 (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/libby/libby- 
risk-text.pdf [hereinafter Amphibole Mineral Fibers] (noting that the Libby asbestos fibers 
are extremely hazardous when inhaled). 
13 Id. at 11 (acknowledging that human activities that disturb the minerals “elevated 
the concentrations of asbestos fibers in the breathing zone of residents and workers”); 
Schneider, Left to Die, supra note 7, at A4 (noting that tremolite laid harmless and undis-
turbed for eons until “mining . . . released the deadly asbestos fibers into the air”). 
14 Indictment, supra note 2, at 418; see Office of Inspector Gen., EPA, EPA’s Actions 
Concerning Asbestos-Contaminated Vermiculite in Libby, Montana 2 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.nycosh.org/workplace_hazards/epa-oig-montana.pdf [hereinafter EPA 
Action Report]. 
15 History of the Libby, Montana Area, http://www.libbymt.com/community/history. 
htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
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Zonolite Company.16 In 1963, Grace acquired control of the mine pur-
suant to a reorganization agreement.17 By that time, numerous state 
and federal authorities had cited the mine for emitting dangerous lev-
els of asbestos.18 For instance, in 1941, the Montana State Board of 
Health initiated an investigation of the mine and “found problems with 
the amount of dust generated by the [mining] activity.”19 In 1956, the 
agency determined that asbestos was a component of the dust, and in 
1962, the agency identified the asbestos as tremolite.20 At that time, 
“state officials were consulting with the Federal Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare about the asbestos.”21 By 1961, the federal De-
partment of the Interior, and the Bureau of Mines had commenced 
investigations as well.22 Grace continued mining until the early 1990s, 
even though tests revealed dangers imposed by the mining activity.23 
B. Tests Put Grace on Notice that the Vermiculite Posed Danger 
 Grace began a series of tests beginning in the mid-1970s to deter-
mine the safety of its operation.24 From 1976 through 1978, Grace con-
ducted a toxicological study in which hamsters were injected with 
tremolite fibers.25 The hamsters subsequently died of mesothelioma, 
indicating that the tremolite was dangerous.26 In 1977, Grace hired a 
consulting firm to review and compare chest x-rays of Libby miners to 
those of miners from Grace’s vermiculite mine in Enoree, South Caro-
lina.27 The comparison revealed a higher incidence of asbestos-related 
disease among Libby miners.28 In 1982, Grace hired an expert to con-
duct a mortality study in which sixty-six death certificates of former 
                                                                                                                      
16 Indictment, supra note 2, at 420; History of the Libby, Montana Area, supra note 15. 
17 Indictment, supra note 2, at 420. 
18 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 3–4. 
19 Id. at 3. 
20 Id. This form of asbestos is considered especially carcinogenic because of the ease 
with which its needle-like fibers penetrate the lungs. Schneider, Left to Die, supra note 7, at 
A4. 
21 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 3. 
22 Id. at 4. 
23 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 7–9. 
24 See United States v. Grace (Grace II ), 455 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (D. Mont. 2006); 
Indictment, supra note 2, at 435–36. These tests established that, when disturbed, the 
tremolite released dangerous asbestiforms into the ambient air. Id. 
25 Grace II, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1159. 
26 Id.; Indictment, supra note 2, at 426. Grace prohibited the results of this study from 
being published. Id. 
27 Grace II, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1159. 
28 Indictment, supra note 2, at 437. There was only one case of clear asbestos disease 
and a few possible cases in South Carolina. Id. 
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Libby workers were examined.29 This study indicated that respiratory 
cancer caused the deaths of an excessive number of Libby miners.30 Air 
monitoring tests revealed that routine occupational activities at the 
mine released “high levels of asbestos fibers” into the air.31 Product tests 
put the company on notice that its products released asbestos into the 
air when used as expected.32 Further, Grace had reason to know that its 
nationwide distribution of vermiculite resulted in harmful effects else-
where.33 For instance, in 1982, an expert advised the company that 
Ohio miners previously exposed to Libby vermiculite concentrate were 
experiencing a “bloody pleural effusion problem.”34 
 Although aware of the dangers caused by occupational exposure, 
the company took action that endangered the wider community as 
well.35 The mine operation resulted in occasional spills, a number of 
processing errors, and excess supply.36 The company merely stored the 
spilled, erroneously processed, and excess vermiculite on the “grounds 
of the screening plant.”37 The company did not implement safeguards 
to protect the public.38 Further, without disclosing the existence of a 
health hazard, the company used the vermiculite as foundation for a 
junior high school track and an elementary school skating rink.39 When 
the company finally ceased operations, it sold the plant without disclos-
ing the contamination.40 Additionally, when EPA arrived in 1999, 
Grace’s officials attempted to cover up the contamination, causing ad-
ditional risk to public health.41 
                                                                                                                      
29 Id. at 440. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 445–46. 
32 Id. at 445. 
33 See id. at 440. 
34 Indictment, supra note 2, at 440. 
35 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 7, at 4. 
36 Indictment, supra note 2, at 421. 
37 Id. 
38 Schneider, Left to Die, supra note 7, at A4 (“Dust from the stacks blanketed the 
nearby mine buildings, where most of the workers were . . . some days, when the east wind 
blew, sheets on the clotheslines of Libby would be covered in the dust, and children would 
write their names in the dust on their parents’ cars.”). 
39 Indictment, supra note 2, at 421. 
40 Id. at 453. 
41 See id. at 456. 
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C. Enter EPA: Investigation and Cleanup 
 EPA commenced an investigation of the Libby site following media 
allegations of asbestos contamination.42 According to the agency, its 
“first priority was to assess the . . . risk to public health” and to take steps 
to enhance safety.43 EPA’s investigation focused on the mining facility, as 
well as schools, residential areas, and other possible contaminated 
places nearby.44 EPA found vermiculite “in piles or mixed in the sodded 
areas outside [of residences]” and determined that various local ele-
mentary, middle, and high school facilities were contaminated.45 Addi-
tionally, EPA agents ordered the closing and repaving of roads used to 
transport the vermiculite to prevent asbestos in the soil from becoming 
airborne.46 In October 2002, EPA added Libby to its National Priorities 
List.47 Notwithstanding these efforts, EPA admitted that some “isolated-
pockets of vermiculite” might be missed during cleanup activities.48 
 A recent assessment of EPA activity in Libby indicated that clean-
up efforts have not been as effective as anticipated.49 “EPA has neither 
planned nor completed a risk and toxicity assessment of the Libby am-
phibole . . . thus [it] cannot be sure that ongoing Libby cleanup is suf-
ficient to prevent humans from contracting asbestos-related diseases.”50 
The most susceptible members of the population are previously ex-
posed adults, smokers, and children.51 Consequently, although the 
mine is no longer in operation, suffering, disease, and death continue 
in Libby, which begs the question, why were the criminal charges al-
                                                                                                                      
42 Libby Asbestos, supra note 1. 
43 Id. 
44 Id; see Montana DEQ/Libby Update 5-22-01 EPA Response, http://www.deq.state.mt. 
us/libby/01-05-22EPAupdate.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
45 Montana DEQ/Libby Update 5-22-01 EPA Response, supra note 44, at 2–3. 
46 Id. 
47 Libby Asbestos, supra note 1. The EPA National Priorities List guides EPA in deter-
mining what sites pose health risks, orchestrating remedial actions, notifying the public of 
possible health risks, and informing potentially responsible parties that they may be liable 
for clean-up costs. Id. 
48 Cleanup Activities—US EPA Region 8, http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/ 
libby/cleanup.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
49 Office of Inspector Gen., EPA, EPA Needs to Plan and Complete a Toxicity 
Assessment for the Libby Asbestos Cleanup 2 (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
oig/reports/2007/20061205-2007-P-00002.pdf [hereinafter Toxicity Report]; U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, supra note 7, at 4, 23. 
50 Toxicity Report, supra note 49, at 2. 
51 Id. at 3. 
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most dismissed?52 The answer lies in the way EPA currently defines and 
regulates asbestos under the CAA.53 
II. An Overview of the CAA 
A. The CAA Generally 
 Congress enacted the CAA to counter the effects of industrial 
growth, population growth, and increased motor-vehicle use on the 
quality of the nation’s air.54 The purpose of the Act is “to protect and 
enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources,” agriculture, and live-
stock.55 Congress further intended the CAA to promote the health and 
general welfare of the nation’s citizens.56 The statute relies on coopera-
tion between the states and the federal government to achieve these 
goals and gives each state “primary responsibility” for achieving air 
quality standards.57 Standards set by EPA are to “accurately reflect the 
latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of 
all identifiable effects on public health or welfare” that can be expected 
from the presence of a particular pollutant in the air.58 If scientific 
knowledge is limited, EPA may “err on the side of over-protection” to 
ensure an adequate margin of safety, as long as its conclusions are sup-
ported by the record.59 
 Scientific risk assessments account for the separate standards gov-
erning pollutants designated as either criteria pollutants or those listed 
as hazardous air pollutants (HAPs).60 Criteria pollutants are those that 
EPA considers a danger to public health and welfare.61 They include 
carbon monoxide, particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, 
                                                                                                                      
52 See United States v. Grace (Grace II ), 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1132 (D. Mont. 2006) 
(holding that the term asbestos in the CAA was too ambiguous to permit criminal sanc-
tions); Schneider, Left to Die, supra note 7, at A4 (“Now the mine is closed, but in Libby, the 
killing goes on.”). 
53 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401–7671, 7412 (2000); Standard for Asbestos Mills, 
40 C.F.R. § 61.142 (2006). 
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)1–2. 
55 Id. § 7401(b)(1). 
56 Id. 
57 See id. §§ 7401(a)(4), 7402(a)–(c), 7407(a). 
58 Id. § 7408(a)(2). 
59 See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1186–87 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2); EPA, Air Quality Management Online Portal, Air Quality 
Goal Setting, http://www.epa.gov/air/aqmportal/management/aq_goalsetting.htm (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Goal Setting]. 
61 Susan F. Mandiberg & Susan L. Smith, Crimes Against the Environment 115 
(1997). 
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ozone, and lead.62 HAPs, on the other hand, are those pollutants that 
EPA has listed because of their tendency to adversely affect human 
health or the environment through inhalation or some alternate means 
of exposure.63 Promulgating regulations under the CAA is therefore a 
two-step process: first, EPA must set technology-based standards, “which 
require major stationary sources to meet emission limitations by using 
maximum achievable control technology,”64 and second, EPA must de-
termine the remaining health risks and regulate accordingly.65 Both 
categories include pollutants specifically listed in the text, as well as those 
added pursuant to statutory provisions.66 Violating CAA regulations can 
result in a variety of penalties, including criminal penalties, which “typi-
cally . . . constitute the pinnacle of the enforcement pyramid.”67 
B. The Criminal Provisions of the CAA 
 Prior to Congress’s creation of environmental felonies, most en-
vironmental law violators received de minimis pollution penalties.68 
Accordingly, companies often found it more cost effective to illegally 
dump and risk fines than to spend the money necessary to properly 
process wastes.69 Eventually, the societal impact of this corporate cost-
benefit analysis became too great, and Congress amended environ-
mental statutes by providing for criminal punishment.70 Congress in-
                                                                                                                      
62 Id. at 115 n.53; see National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards, 
40 C.F.R. § 50 (2006). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)-(2); Mandiberg & Smith, supra note 61, at 115. 
64 Goal Setting, supra note 60. 
65 Id. 
66 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(A)-(C) (noting that the Administrator is to establish a commit-
tee responsible for periodically reviewing criteria pollutant standards); see id. § 7412(b)(2) 
(“The Administrator shall periodically review the list established . . . and, where appropriate, 
revise such list by rule, adding pollutants which present, or may present, through inhalation 
or other routes of exposure, a threat of adverse human health effects.”). 
67 See Mandiberg & Smith, supra note 61, at 107. 
68 See Dick Thornburgh, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws—A National Priority, 
59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 775, 775 (1991) (“For businesses, governments, and most citizens, 
pollution seemed a small price to pay, both in terms of the cost to the environment and in 
terms of public spending.”). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 775–76. Congress decided that the social costs of pollution were too high once 
medical waste and sewage began to wash ashore, drinking water became contaminated, 
and radioactive waste threatened health and welfare. Id; see David W. Case, Changing Corpo-
rate Behavior Through Environmental Management Systems, 31 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y 
Rev. 75, 92 (2006) (“Criminal provisions were added to various federal environmental 
statutes throughout the 1970s. However, the ‘American phenomenon’ of the ‘criminaliza-
tion of environmental law’ did not commence in earnest until the late 1980s and into the 
1990s . . . after Congress created environmental felonies . . . .”). 
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tended these penalties to force dramatic changes, rather than codify 
existing norms of behavior.71 The 1990 Amendments to the CAA, for 
example, increased the scope of criminal and civil violations, as well as 
monetary fines and jail terms; introduced a new framework for impos-
ing penalties; alerted corporate officers of their potential for liability; 
and encouraged citizen suits.72 
 The criminal provisions of the CAA are located in § 7413(c), 
which: (1) lays out the requirements for establishing a knowing viola-
tion of an implementation plan; (2) provides for knowingly making 
false material statements, representations, or certifications, and also for 
the omission, altering, or concealing of material information, and neg-
ligent upkeep of records; (3) addresses the knowing failure to pay any 
fee owed to the United States; (4) penalizes the negligent release of any 
HAP or hazardous substance into the ambient air; and (5) penalizes 
knowing, intentional releases.73 Section 7413(c)(5)(A) provides: 
Any person who knowingly releases into the ambient air any 
hazardous air pollutant listed pursuant to section 7412 of this 
title or any extremely hazardous substance listed pursuant to 
section 11002(a)(2) of this title that is not listed in section 
section 7412 of this title, and who knows at the time that he thereby 
places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily 
injury shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine under title 
18 or by imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both.74 
 Therefore, establishing a claim under § 7413(c)(5) requires prov-
ing that the accused knowingly caused another to be placed in immi-
nent danger by releasing a HAP or extremely hazardous substance into 
the ambient air.75 HAPs include air pollutants listed in § 7412, as well as 
substances added pursuant to § 7112(b)(2) & (3) and regulations codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. § 61.01.76 Courts have construed the provision so as 
                                                                                                                      
71 Case, supra note 70, at 79 (noting that environmental law is an “activist form of gov-
ernment . . . requiring innovative alternatives to traditional environmental regulatory ap-
proaches”); see Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environ-
mental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 Geo. L.J. 2407, 2421–22 (1995) (stating 
that environmental laws “reflect the nation’s aspirations for environmental quality”). 
72 David Wooley & Elizabeth Morss, Enforcement, Rulemaking and Judicial Review, in 
Clean Air Act Handbook § 7:1 (2007). 
73 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (c)(1)-(5) (2000). 
74 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A) (emphasis added). Ambient air is defined simply as un-
confined, open air. EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 6. EPA does not have a National 
Ambient Air Quality (NAAQ) standard for asbestos. Id. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5); Mandiberg & Smith, supra note 61, at 132. 
76 Mandiberg & Smith, supra note 61, at 133 n.162. 
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not to require that defendants be aware that they are acting in violation 
of any law.77 To date, CAA criminal enforcement provisions focus al-
most exclusively on asbestos regulation.78 
III. Asbestos, the Regulatory Scheme of the CAA, and the 
Exclusion of Certain Contaminants 
A. The Nature of Asbestos 
 The term asbestos is used to describe “a number of naturally oc-
curring, fibrous silicate minerals mined for their useful properties such 
as thermal insulation, chemical and thermal stability, and high tensile 
strength.”79 Asbestos is comprised of microscopic fibers that can “be-
come airborne when asbestos-containing materials are damaged or dis-
turbed.”80 Although any inhalation of airborne asbestos fibers increases 
the risk of developing an asbestos-related disease, asbestos fibers are 
even more dangerous when they remain lodged in the lungs.81 
 The three diseases most commonly associated with asbestos expo-
sure are malignant mesothelioma, lung cancer, and asbestosis.82 Malig-
nant mesothelioma is a cancer of the lungs’ pleural lining.83 Lung can-
cer is cancer of the lung tissue.84 Asbestosis is the scarring of the lung, 
resulting in decreased lung function.85 All three diseases are character-
ized by long latency periods following initial exposure.86 Consequently, 
an asbestos-related disease may be present for years before symptoms 
emerge.87 Those exposed to asbestos today will “continue to suffer and 
eventually die decades into the future.”88 
                                                                                                                      
77 See United States v. Grace (Grace I ), 429 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1228 (D. Mont. 2006) 
(recognizing the CAA as a public welfare statute). 
78 Mandiberg & Smith, supra note 61, at 123. 
79 Asbestos, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/asbestos (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
80 Id. 
81 Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 6; Jennifer L. Leonardi, Comment, It’s Still Here! 
The Continuing Battle Over Asbestos in America, 16 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 129, 133 (2005) (“Signifi-
cant health concerns arise when asbestos is inhaled in high concentrations over an ex-
tended period of time.”). It is important to note that the Libby asbestos’s needle-like fibers 
facilitate lung penetration. Schneider, Left to Die, supra note 7, at A4. 
82 Leonardi, supra note 81, at 133. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 3, at 4 (“Asbestos-related maladies rarely 
occur in less than ten years after first exposure.”); see Leonardi, supra note 81, at 134. 
87 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 3, at 4; Leonardi, supra note 81, at 134. 
88 Leonardi, supra note 81, at 134. 
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 Even though there is no safe level of asbestos exposure, insuffi-
cient data on certain asbestiforms continues to stifle effective asbestos 
regulation.89 Currently, there is no uniform classification system for as-
bestiforms.90 According to the Mine Safety Health Administration 
(MSHA), “[M]ineral names are not applied in a uniform manner and 
are not all consistent with presently accepted mineralogical nomencla-
ture and definitions.”91 Similarly, the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services acknowledges that “toxicological information is cur-
rently limited and the exact level of health concern for different sizes 
and types of asbestos remains controversial.”92 These limitations make it 
difficult to classify all asbestiforms according to health risk.93 Since ef-
forts to reduce environmental risk “should be based on the best avail-
able scientific information,” limitations on science have similarly im-
peded agency responsiveness.94 
B. CAA Regulation of Asbestos: The National Emissions Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants 
 EPA established the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants (NESHAP) pursuant to § 7412 of the CAA.95 This section 
requires EPA to set national emissions standards for all major and area 
sources of HAPs.96 Major sources are defined as “any stationary source 
or group of stationary sources located within a contiguous area and 
under common control that emits or has the potential to emit . . . 10 
tons per year or more of any hazardous air pollutant.”97 An area source 
is defined as “any stationary source of hazardous air pollutants that is 
not a major source.”98 
                                                                                                                      
89 Indictment, supra note 2, at 426; U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., supra note 
9, at 10. 
90 Asbestos Exposure Limit, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,950, 43,952 ( July 29, 2005) (to be codified 
at 30 C.F.R. pts. 56, 57, 71). 
91 Id. 
92 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., supra note 9, at 10. 
93 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 18; U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 
supra note 9, at 10. 
94 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 18. Whether or not this reliance on scientific 
data is justified is discussed below. See discussion infra Part V.B.1–3. 
95 The Asbestos Informer, Region 4, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region04/air/as- 
bestos/inform.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Asbestos Informer]. 
96 Id. 
97 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2000); United States v. Grace (Grace II ), 455 
F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 n.3 (D. Mont. 2006); Asbestos Informer, supra note 95. 
98 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(2); Grace II, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 n.3. 
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 EPA promulgated the first NESHAP regulation governing asbestos 
in 1973.99 The NESHAP for asbestos covers “milling to produce com-
mercial asbestos, manufacturing, and fabrication of products that con-
tain commercial asbestos.”100 Asbestos is commercial when it is milled 
or produced for its commercial value.101 In contrast, amphiboles and 
other naturally occurring contaminants are not covered because they 
are emitted only incidentally.102 Because the Libby asbestos is not com-
mercially produced, it is not explicitly regulated by the CAA.103 Scholars 
find it difficult to explain the basis for EPA’s distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial asbestos, except to note that EPA lacked 
requisite knowledge of asbestos contaminants when it implemented the 
NESHAP program.104 
C. EPA Pleas Insufficient Data on Contaminant Asbestos 
 When EPA created the NESHAP “little was known about the extent 
and effects of contaminant asbestos.”105 Thus, EPA officials initially fo-
cused on commercial asbestos products and stated their intent to ad-
dress contaminant-asbestos regulation in the future.106 A separate con-
taminant-asbestos NESHAP would have explicitly covered emissions 
from “beneficiation processes and exfoliation plants, such as the Libby 
mine.”107 However, EPA has not promulgated new regulations despite 
numerous indications of the dangers posed by amphiboles and other 
contaminants.108 
                                                                                                                      
99 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 5. 
100 Id.; see Asbestos Informer, supra note 95 (“On March 31, 1971, EPA identified asbes-
tos as a hazardous pollutant, and on April 6, 1973, EPA promulgated the Asbestos 
NESHAP in 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart M.”). The NESHAP also covers the renovation and 
demolition of structures containing asbestos, and asbestos waste disposal requirements. 
EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 5. 
101 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 5. 
102 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Taconite Iron Ore 
Processing, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,868, 61,881 (Oct. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
103 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 5. 
104 Id. The fact that asbestos contaminants are not regulated seems primarily, if not 
completely, due to the fact that EPA had insufficient data on contaminants when it imple-
mented the NESHAP program. Id. “When Congress listed asbestos as a HAP in section 
112(b)(1), it did not further explain the term in the statute, and EPA is not aware of any 
legislative history addressing the term asbestos.” National Emission Standards for Hazard-
ous Air Pollutants: Taconite Iron Ore Procesing, 68 Fed. Reg. at 61,881. 
105 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 5. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 5–6. 
108 See A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act to Provide for Attainment and Maintenance 
of Health Protective National Ambient Air Quality Standards, and for Other Purposes, S. 
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 For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in 
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, put EPA on notice that asbestos contami-
nants were carcinogenic.109 In Reserve Mining Co., the United States and 
the State of Montana sought an injunction preventing the Reserve Min-
ing Company from discharging amphibole-contaminated taconite tail-
ings into the ambient air.110 The district court “granted the requested 
relief and ordered that the discharges immediately cease, thus effec-
tively closing the plant.”111 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the 
order, effectively closing the plant, was unreasonable.112 Although there 
were notable similarities between amphiboles and regulated asbesti-
forms, the court refused to close the plant without additional data link-
ing the former to health risk.113 The Reserve Mining Co. decision is sig-
nificant because it gave EPA reason to study the effects of contaminant 
asbestos in 1975 in order to establish a link between contaminant-
asbestos exposure and health risk, or at least prove that no such link 
existed.114 EPA, however, elected not to act.115 
 EPA similarly overlooked congressional direction to study con-
taminant asbestiforms.116 In 1990, the U.S. Senate discussed Senate Bill 
1630, an amendment to the CAA, directing EPA to conduct a study 
evaluating health effects of serpentine and amphibole asbestiforms.117 
The amendment also required the administration to issue “statutory or 
regulatory changes” should the study reveal a necessity for such 
changes.118 The relevant portion of the amendment read as follows: 
 The Administrator in conjunction with the Health Effects 
Institute shall conduct a study to identify, characterize, and 
quantify risks to human health from exposure to each form of 
asbestos, including but not limited to the health effects of 
                                                                                                                      
1630, 102d Cong. § 216 (1990) [hereinafter CAA Bill]; Reserve Mining. Co. v. EPA, 514 
F.2d 492, 499 (8th Cir. 1975). 
109 Reserve Mining Co., 514 F.2d at 499. 
110 Id. The United States and the State of Montana also sought relief for taconite tail-
ings discharged into Lake Superior. Id. 
111 Id. 
112 See id. at 500. 
113 Id. at 500, 520. 
114 See id. at 520 (“[T]he significance of the risk can only be ascertained through 
knowledge of the threatened harm.”). 
115 See CAA Bill, supra note 108. If EPA had taken regulatory action following Reserve 
Mining Co., Congress would not have had to direct EPA to further study asbestos contami-
nants in Senate Bill 1630. See id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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serpentine and amphibole fibers, and report to Congress 
within twenty-four months after enactment of this section. Not 
later than 90 days after completion and submission of such 
study, the Administrator shall report to Congress with rec-
ommendations for modifications or changes, if any, to statu-
tory or regulatory requirements under this Act. Such recom-
mendations shall be based on the findings of the study 
prepared under this section and such other information as 
the Administrator deems appropriate.119 
 Although this bill addressed contaminant asbestos to some extent, 
it was more heavily focused on asbestos abatement in schools and as-
sessing removal costs.120 As such, EPA’s interest in regulating contami-
nants was suppressed by the necessity and expense of implementing the 
NESHAP.121 Consequently, although the amphibole asbestos found in 
Libby is far more toxic than other asbestiforms currently subject to EPA 
regulation, it remains unlisted in the regulations because it is deemed 
noncommercial.122 Scholars find EPA’s unwillingness to regulate this 
asbestiform particularly troubling in light of the fact that amphibole is 
regulated elsewhere around the world and, in some instances, is 
banned.123 “More than thirty other countries around the world have 
recognized the harmful effects of asbestos exposure and have banned, 
or are in the process of banning, [asbestos-containing materials].”124 
The consequence of EPA’s failure to follow suit is that those responsible 
for these emissions are effectively granted a free pass to pollute.125 
 EPA’s failure to regulate these contaminants under the CAA, or 
any other regulatory scheme, creates a loophole through which crimi-
                                                                                                                      
119 Id. 
120 See id. 
121 See EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 6 (“[T]he effort to regulate contaminant 
asbestos ended because resources were needed to implement the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990.”). 
122 Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 6 (“The asbestos found in Libby is among the 
most potent and dangerous asbestiform varieties.”); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Serv., supra note 9, at 3 (“The amphibole group of asbestos minerals has a relatively high 
iron content compared to chrysotile, giving them a higher durability or biopersistence in 
living tissue and thus a higher carcinogenic potential.”); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, 
supra note 3, at 8 (noting that the CAA standard does not apply to contaminant-asbestos 
ores, “[W]hich are processed for purposes other than extracting their asbestos content”). 
123 See Leonardi, supra note 81, at 130. 
124 Id. 
125 See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 509–10 (8th Cir. 1975); United States 
v. Grace (Grace II ), 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128–33 (D. Mont. 2006). 
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nal defendants may avoid prosecution.126 Evasion of the statute is per-
mitted because of an unexplained distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial asbestos.127 The government’s pending action against 
Grace for CAA violations is evidence of this result.128 
IV. The Saga of United States v. Grace: Illustration  
of a CAA Loophole 
A. The District Court’s Harmful Errors 
 EPA’s investigation of the Libby site revealed that “the conditions 
at the site presented an imminent and substantial threat to human 
health and the environment.”129 After EPA linked the contamination to 
Grace, the United States filed a ten-count criminal indictment against 
Grace and seven of its current and former corporate officers for com-
mitting knowing endangerment violations of the CAA.130 In March 
2006, the defendants sought dismissal in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Montana on numerous grounds, including failure to specify 
the nature of the substance released.131 The challenge was based on the 
parties’ contradicting definitions of the term asbestos.132 The court ini-
tially found the disagreement unrelated to the issue of dismissal.133 
However, in its August 2006 order, the court adopted a definition of 
asbestos to prevent the jury from hearing “lengthy and potentially con-
fusing [expert] testimony” on asbestos’s mineralogy.134 
                                                                                                                      
126 Grace II, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1132–33. Because EPA had not issued regulations explic-
itly covering asbestos contaminants, the court would not impose criminal liability. Id. 
127 See id.; EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 5. 
128 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 18–19, 26–34. 
129 Indictment, supra note 2, at 423. 
130 Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 13. 
131 United States v. Grace (Grace I ), 429 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1238 (D. Mont. 2006). The 
defendants’ arguments for dismissal included: alleged duplicity in the superseding indict-
ment; violation of their Fifth & Sixth Amendment rights; failure to allege a required ele-
ment of knowing endangerment claim; failure to allege the breach of an emissions stan-
dard; failure to sufficiently apprise the defendants of the nature of the offense charged; 
statute of limitations and duplicity violations; and failure to state a wire-tapping offense. Id. 
at 1219–45. The district court ruled in favor of the government, except with regard to the 
latter two charges. See id. at 1247. 
132 Id. at 1238. 
133 Id. 
134 United States v. Grace (Grace II ), 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1126 (D. Mont. 2006). 
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1. The Parties Seek a Ruling on the Congressionally Intended Meaning 
of Asbestos 
 In August 2006, both parties filed motions in limine urging the 
court to uphold opposing definitions of asbestos under the statute.135 
The government argued for a broad definition of asbestos that would 
include all of the minerals in the Libby amphibole.136 In contrast, the 
defendants urged the court to apply the definition set forth in the regu-
lations implementing the CAA, thereby excluding most of the govern-
ment’s evidence.137 The defendants argued that the government’s defi-
nition would create two definitions of asbestos within the same 
statute.138 Specifically, releases from regulated sources would constitute 
asbestos if they were of the nature specified in the regulations.139 A 
broader definition, however, would apply to releases from unregulated 
sources.140 The court turned to the rules of statutory interpretation to 
ascertain Congress’s intended meaning of the term asbestos.141 
2. The August 8, 2006 Order Adopts the Definition of Asbestos 
Proposed by the Defendants 
 The court’s application of the cannons of statutory interpretation 
in its August 8, 2006 order resulted in the adoption of the defendants’ 
proposed definition.142 The court determined that the CAA presented 
an ambiguity on the matter of how asbestos should be defined.143 The 
court further held that the principle of lenity required resolving am-
biguities within criminal statues in favor of the defendants.144 As such, 
the court determined that: 
[A]n intolerable risk of unfair prejudice [would result] should 
the government be allowed to put on expert after expert testi-
fying that the Defendants endangered others through the re-
lease of a deadly composite of minerals without stating with 
any certainty what percentage of the minerals released are 
                                                                                                                      
135 Id. at 1124. 
136 Id. at 1122, 1124. 
137 Id. at 1124. 
138 Id. at 1129. 
139 Id. 
140 Grace II, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1129. 
141 Id. at 1126–27. 
142 See id. at 1132–33 (excluding the government’s evidence). 
143 Id. at 1132. 
144 Id. 
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covered by the criminal statute under which the defendants 
are charged.145 
Therefore, although the knowing endangerment provision explicitly 
refers to § 7412―which lists asbestos as a HAP, and does not distinguish 
among asbestos varieties―the court found that the government’s posi-
tion would violate the principle of lenity.146 This order prevented the 
government from admitting scientific evidence and expert testimony 
on samples taken from Libby that are commingled with unregulated as-
bestiforms.147 
3. The Government Appeals 
 The government filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit on August 23, 2006.148 The appeal focused largely on 
the district court’s misreading of the CAA and the court’s conclusions 
after applying the cannons of statutory interpretation.149 The govern-
ment argued that the district court mistakenly applied a narrower defi-
nition of asbestos found in NESHAP regulations even though NESHAP 
“does not . . . apply to Grace’s Libby operations.”150 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit considered whether this evidentiary exclusion was 
proper.151 
4. The Ninth Circuit Reverses and Remands 
 On September 20, 2007, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s order and adopted the definition of asbestos found in 
§ 7412(b).152 The Ninth Circuit held that, absent a statutory definition, 
                                                                                                                      
145 Id. 
146 Grace II, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (“Without the regulations § 7412(b)(1)’s listing of 
hazardous air pollutants is meaningless. Absent reference to the regulations a citizen is left 
with no guidance about prohibited conduct except the unsatisfactory one-word definition 
of asbestos in § 7412(b)(1).”). Further, the court noted that the regulations were in place 
prior to the 1990 Amendments and, pursuant to § 7412(q)(1), they remained in effect. Id. 
at 1126, 1129 n.7. 
147 Id. at 1132–33. 
148 See generally Brief of Appellant, supra note 5 (asserting various arguments for over-
ruling the district court decision). 
149 Id. at 17–19. 
150 Id. at 18. 
151 See United States v. Grace (Grace III ), 504 F.3d 745, 754 (9th Cir. 2007); Grace II, 455 
F. Supp. 2d at 1128–29, 1133 (conceding to the government’s point that this case is not a 
NESHAP case, yet excluding evidence that does not comport with the definition of asbes-
tos in NESHAP regulations). 
152 Grace III, 504 F.3d at 766–67. 
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the term asbestos must be construed according to its ordinary mean-
ing.153 Finding the common meaning of asbestos unambiguous, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the lower court erred in invoking the len-
ity principle.154 Additionally, the court emphasized the validity of Con-
gress’s use of “multiple enforcement mechanisms” to achieve its objec-
tives.155 For instance, two enforcement mechanisms comprise the CAA, 
one civil and the other criminal.156 The former regulates major sources 
of HAPs and, therefore, focuses strictly on commercial asbestiforms.157 
The latter, however, focuses on public health risk.158 The Ninth Circuit 
determined that where a threat to health exists, the source of the emis-
sion is irrelevant.159 Therefore, there were no grounds for permitting 
emissions of deadly asbestiforms simply because they were, and con-
tinue to be, noncommercially produced.160 
 Although the Ninth Circuit restored justice in some sense, the saga 
continues. The September 2007 order only places the knowing endan-
germent query back into the hands of a jury.161 Absent regulation, the 
same result could be achieved at trial through “different means.”162 
V. Restoring Justice by Revising Outdated Regulations 
A. Regulation of Contaminant Asbestos Is the Best Possible Redress 
 To date, EPA does not regulate asbestos contaminants despite nu-
merous indications that such regulation is needed.163 EPA attributes its 
                                                                                                                      
153 Id. at 755. The court understood the ordinary meaning of asbestos to be a “fibrous, 
non-combustible compound that can be composed of several substances, typically includ-
ing magnesium.” Id. 
154 Id. at 755–56. 
155 Id. at 756. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Grace III, 504 F.3d at 756. 
159 See id. (“The direct enforcement mechanism created in 42 U.S.C. § 7413 focuses on 
risks to health. Therefore it provides oversight of release of hazardous pollutants whether 
or not they come from major sources of pollution.”). 
160 See id. at 756–57. 
161 Id. The court reversed the district court’s order limiting the government’s evidence 
to minerals covered by the civil regulations. Id.; see Andrew Schneider, Big Asbestos Prosecu-
tion in Jeopardy, U.S. Argues, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jun. 5, 2007, at A7, available at 
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/318479_grace05.html [hereinafter Schneider, Asbes-
tos Prosecution] 
162 Schneider, Asbestos Prosecution, supra note 161, at A7. 
163 See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., supra note 9, at 1, 4, 8, 18 (illustrating 
the dangers of contaminant asbestos in St. Louis resulting from Libby contaminated ver-
miculite); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 3, at 5–7 (laying out numerous inci-
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regulatory failure to scientific uncertainty, competing regulatory priori-
ties, and fragmented agency authority.164 However, in light of the risks 
posed by amphiboles and the potential for future exposure, these justi-
fications are inadequate.165 Therefore, EPA should take regulatory ac-
tion rather than relying on after-the-fact efforts such as “aggressive 
Superfund cleanup” and judicially imposed remedies.166 
 EPA is aware of the need for regulations in this area.167 In the early 
1970s, EPA lacked the information needed to draft regulations for as-
bestos contaminants.168 As a result, EPA chose to focus on drafting 
regulations for commercial asbestos, revisit regulating asbestos con-
taminants at a later time, and implement a separate NESHAP if neces-
sary.169 A separate NESHAP would have “regulated emissions from ben-
eficiation processes and exfoliation plants,” such as Libby.170 However, 
the effort to regulate contaminants dissipated when “resources were 
needed to implement the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.”171 
Shortly thereafter, the Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA decision indicated that 
the need to study and regulate asbestos contaminants remained.172 In 
                                                                                                                      
dents that indicated to EPA that asbestos-contaminant regulations were needed). See gener-
ally CAA Bill, supra note 108 (implementing an amendment encouraging EPA study of 
contaminant asbestos). 
164 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 21. 
165 See Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, Chemical-Specific Health 
Consultation: Tremolite Asbestos and Other Related Types of Asbestos 8–9 (2001), 
available at http://www.umt.edu/libbyhealth/science/online_resources/atsdr_health_consul- 
tation.htm (observing that asbestos contaminants can still be found in crayons, garden prod-
ucts, and other commercial items); Schneider, Left to Die, supra note 7, at A4. 
166 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 5 (acknowledging EPA’s clean-up effort but 
failure to address prevention); see Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, 
supra note 165, at 2 (referencing “proposals . . . to consider changing U.S. asbestos regula-
tions to include other asbestiform amphiboles”). 
167 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 5; U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 
3, at 6. 
168 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 5–6. 
169 Id. “EPA at this time believes that asbestos releases from the milling of such ores 
should be covered by the hazardous air pollutant regulations and intends in the near fu-
ture to propose for comment regulations which would accomplish this.” 39 Fed. Reg. 
15,397 (May 3, 1974). 
170 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 6. 
171 Id. 
172 Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d 492, 519–20 (8th Cir. 1975). “[W]e 
cannot say that Reserve’s [emissions] should be considered asbestos for the purposes of 
this regulation . . . . At the most, asbestos occurs as a contaminant in a component . . . of 
the taconite that Reserve processes to produce iron ore pellets.” Id. at 525. It should be 
noted that EPA’s neglect of contaminants prevents states from adequately addressing these 
contaminants. See id. at 526 (refusing to provide a remedy under a state statute because the 
EPA manufacturing standard applied). 
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that case, regulatory inaction prevented the court from implementing a 
drastic―but necessary―remedy.173 
 In 1978, “EPA learned that workers at a chemical fertilizer plant in 
. . . Ohio, were exhibiting symptoms of asbestos-related diseases.”174 
Libby vermiculite was believed to be the source of the contamination.175 
In response, EPA “issue[d] a series of reports on the potential risk of 
asbestos-contaminated vermiculite.”176 The first report claimed that EPA 
lacked sufficient data to assess the risks associated with asbestos-
contaminated vermiculite.177 The second report outlined options for 
regulatory action.178 The third acknowledged that occupational expo-
sure to the contaminated vermiculite had adverse affects on miners’ 
health.179 The fourth and final report described the results of tests con-
ducted on air and soil samples taken from three major U.S. vermiculite 
mining sites.180 In 1985, EPA released yet another report, titled, Exposure 
Assessment for Asbestos-Contaminated Vermiculite, which determined that the 
operation of a St. Louis mine―also used for Libby vermiculite process-
ing―could result in airborne emissions.181 None of these reports trig-
gered regulatory action by EPA, and the issue remained unaddressed 
until the 1990 CAA amendment legislative debates, when Congress in-
structed EPA to research the effects of asbestos contaminants.182 
 In 1994, a Libby citizen notified EPA “that dust from the site . . . 
was harming Libby residents.”183 Although EPA referred the complaint 
to the state agency, “[T]he state did not take any action because the 
asbestos found in the vermiculite at the site . . . was not considered 
commercial asbestos.”184 EPA informed the complainant that it did not 
intend to investigate.185 In 1996, a second complaint was filed.186 Al-
though EPA was required to “conduct a preliminary assessment” within 
                                                                                                                      
173 Id. (ordering abatement, not closure, on reasonable terms). 
174 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 3, at 6. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 3, at 6. 
181 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., supra note 10, at 7. The St. Louis facility is 
“known to have processed at least 139,460 tons of vermiculite ore that originated from the 
Libby, Montana mine and other sources.” Id. at 8. 
182 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 7, at 7; see CAA Bill, supra note 
108, § 216. 
183 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 3, at 8. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 18. 
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one year of receiving notification of a hazardous release, there is no 
indication that it performed this assessment.187 Indeed, EPA did not 
enter the site to investigate until 1999, following reports of “deaths or 
illnesses of almost 600 current or former Libby residents exposed to 
asbestos-contaminated vermiculite ore.”188 Although EPA denied hav-
ing knowledge of the contamination prior to 1999, communications 
dating back to 1984 cast significant doubt on that assertion.189 
 Further, in March 2001, the Inspector General of EPA recom-
mended that EPA “examine the risks associated with asbestos-contam-
inated vermiculite in order to safeguard public health and the envi-
ronment.”190 In response to this recommendation, EPA agreed to “de-
velop a plan to determine the need for a national emissions standard” 
for asbestos-contaminated sources and ores.191 In April 2003, the Direc-
tor for the Agency on National Resources and the Environment rear-
ticulated EPA’s commitment to further research on asbestos-contam-
inated ore.192 At that time, EPA was in the process of “examining the 
need to recommend changes to laws and policies to address contami-
nant asbestos.”193 
 EPA should now revisit the area of asbestos contaminants and 
consider implementing a separate NESHAP, or at least promulgating 
explicit regulations on contaminant asbestos.194 Alternatively, EPA 
should consider regulating asbestos contaminants as criteria pollut-
ants under National Ambient Air Quality (NAAQ) standards.195 Im-
plementing a NAAQ standard for asbestos contaminants would have 
permitted air testing upon EPA’s arrival in Libby.196 However, EPA has 
                                                                                                                      
187 Id. 
188 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 3, at 8. 
189 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 16. “The Government encourages the im-
pression that the EPA first learned of asbestos-related disease in Libby in 1999. Nothing 
could be further from the truth . . . . The health problems among former Grace workers 
and some family members were well-known and much-studied decades earlier.” Appellees’ 
Joint Response Brief, supra note 5, at 39. 
190 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 3, at 13. 
191 Id. 
192 See generally id. (discussing a number of research initiatives taken by EPA in attempt 
to obtain more data on asbestos contaminants). 
193 Id. at 12. 
194 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 6 (recommending that EPA “reconsider 
regulating contaminant asbestos” because new health effects of these contaminants con-
tinue to surface). 
195 Id. (recommending that EPA reconsider the need for regulation of asbestos in am-
bient air under the CAA). 
196 Id. 
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been unable to assess air toxicity in Libby.197 The agency now expects 
to complete this assessment by 2010.198 
 Failure to regulate in this area leaves the Libby community ex-
posed to asbestos contaminants.199 Nonetheless, the MSHA counsels 
against redefining asbestos to include contaminants for three reasons: 
(1) MSHA maintains that lowering exposure limits and educating the 
mining community on the “asbestos hazard in mining” is a more prac-
tical solution;200 (2) redefining asbestos calls for broad-scale inter-
agency cooperation, additional scientific research, and a delay in grant-
ing miners’ benefits;201 and (3) MSHA concluded that a Libby-like 
mine is not likely to reemerge because of the high risks that the mine’s 
product would be “commercially unmarketable.”202 MSHA’s arguments 
against regulating asbestos contaminants are not compelling.203 The 
MSHA’s position only contributes to the problem by aiding compa-
nies―like Grace―in their pursuit of capital, while blatantly disregard-
ing the public welfare.204 In light of new information revealing possible 
risks from other types of mining activities, future exposure does not 
seem far-fetched.205 
B. Scientific Uncertainties Are an Inadequate Justification for EPA Inaction 
 EPA’s primary explanation for refusing to regulate asbestos con-
taminants is that it lacks the requisite knowledge for drafting regula-
tions.206 EPA’s position rests on three unqualified assumptions: scientific 
                                                                                                                      
197 Toxicity Report, supra note 49, at 2; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra 
note 7, at 4, 26. 
198 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 7, at 4, 26. 
199 See id. at 4. 
200 Asbestos Exposure Limit, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,952 ( July 29, 2005) (to be codified at 30 
C.F.R. pts. 56, 57, 71). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 7–12; Schneider, Left to Die, supra note 7, at A4. 
204 See United States v. Grace (Grace II), 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1132 (D. Mont. 2006). 
But for EPA regulations on contaminant asbestos, the district court would have allowed 
submission of the government’s evidence. See id. 
205 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 10. Notably, when asked about their inten-
tions for the Libby mine, the new owners replied, “There’s a lot of ore left in that hill.” 
Andrew Schneider, Miners’ Search for Gold Led to Vermiculite, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 
Nov. 11, 1999, at A11, available at 1999 WLNR 1999692. 
206 EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at 18–19 (identifying “limitations of science, 
technology, and health effects data” as barriers to regulation of asbestos contaminants); 
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 7, at 7 (referencing EPA reports that 
“identified problems in sampling, analysis, and reproducibility of data regarding . . . ver-
miculite, which made it difficult to acquire data on exposure and health effects”). 
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certainty is required before it can promulgate regulations; currently 
available data on asbestos contaminants is not sufficient for regulation; 
and scientific classifications trump health concerns. 
1. EPA Regulations Need Not Be Based on Scientific Certainty 
 Courts have held that insufficient data is not a blanket excuse for 
failing to regulate, particularly when dealing with dangerous agents.207 
For instance, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the U.S. Supreme Court recently 
rejected EPA’s claim that it lacked sufficient data on which to regulate 
greenhouse gases.208 The Court held that EPA cannot “avoid its statu-
tory obligation by noting the uncertainty surrounding various features 
of climate change.”209 Rather, EPA must ask whether “sufficient infor-
mation exists to make an endangerment finding.”210 Should such in-
formation exist, EPA must either regulate or provide a reasonable ex-
planation for not regulating.211 Because EPA had not offered a 
“reasoned explanation” for its refusal to determine whether a causal 
connection existed between greenhouse gases and climate change, its 
refusal to regulate was deemed “arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.”212 
 EPA’s refusal to regulate asbestos contaminants is equally arbitrary 
and capricious.213 Although EPA continually asserts that it lacks suffi-
cient information on asbestos contaminants, the Libby debacle presents 
more than adequate support for regulation.214 Based on the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA has sufficient data on which 
to act.215 
2. The Known Dangers of Asbestos Justify EPA Regulation of 
Contaminant Asbestos 
 Irrespective of whether EPA is satisfied by data currently available 
on contaminant asbestos, the dangers of these varieties provide suffi-
                                                                                                                      
207 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1444 (2007). 
208 Id. at 1463. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 1462. 
212 Id. at 1463. 
213 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 3, at 7. 
214 See Schneider, Left to Die, supra note 7, at A4. 
215 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1444. 
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cient grounds for promulgating regulations.216 Amphiboles, tremolite, 
and other contaminants are retained in the lungs for longer periods of 
time, and are, therefore, more carcinogenic than chrysotile fibers.217 
Further, the common dangerous features of all asbestiforms permit 
EPA to make judgments about what policies best safeguard public 
health.218 In making these judgments, EPA may take available data on 
similar substances into account.219 
 For example, in Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, the court up-
held EPA regulation of “less chlorinated PCBs” over assertions that EPA 
lacked sufficient data.220 Although scientific knowledge about these 
substances was limited, EPA argued that the known hazards of “more 
chlorinated PCBs,” combined with similarities among the two groups, 
constituted an adequate basis for regulation.221 The court reasoned: 
Industry petitioners contend that EPA lacked an adequate basis 
for the regulations under review because of the incomplete sci-
entific knowledge about less chlorinated PCBs. In effect, they 
assert that EPA must demonstrate the toxicity of each chemical 
it seeks to regulate through studies demonstrating a clear line 
of causation between a particular chemical and harm to public 
health or the environment. We do not agree.222 
Finding similar properties between the compounds, the court upheld 
the EPA regulations on “less chlorinated PCBs.”223 Similarly, the com-
mon dangerous propensities among commercial asbestos and asbestos 
contaminants justify extrapolating from what is known about the for-
mer to ensure that the latter does not threaten public health.224 
                                                                                                                      
216 See Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that EPA 
could rely on data obtained on “more chlorinated PCBs” to regulate “less chlorinated 
PCBs” because the two compounds share dangerous propensities). 
217 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., supra note 10, at 10. 
218 See Envtl. Def. Fund, 598 F.2d at 83. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 78–79. Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) “are a group of [toxic] chlorinated 
hydrocarbon chemicals” having a variety of industrial uses. Id. at 66. PCBs are divided into 
two groups, “less chlorinated PCBs” and “more chlorinated PCBs.” Id. at 78. Prior to the 
1970s, the latter were increasingly produced; however, public pressure led to a shift to 
greater reliance on “less chlorinated PCBs.” Id. at 78–79. Unfortunately, scientific knowl-
edge on this group of PCBs is needed. Id. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 83. 
223 Id. at 102. 
224 See Envtl. Def. Fund, 598 F.2d at 102. 
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3. Scientific Classifications Should Not Be Dispositive Where Human 
Life Is Threatened 
 Contaminant-asbestos emissions are unregulated even though the 
resulting health risk is well established.225 EPA argues that difficulties 
related to classifying asbestos fibers create obstacles to effective regula-
tion.226 Its desire for more precise scientific data has come at the ex-
pense of public welfare.227 
 Chemical distinctions are significant from a scientific standpoint, 
but do not add much as regulatory terminology unless that terminol-
ogy is linked to risk.228 Thus “regulatory decisions [should not] hinge 
on such details as [chemical composition]” when health risk is estab-
lished.229 Nevertheless, chemical properties unjustifiably affect whether 
legislators legislate, agencies regulate, and egregious crimes are pun-
ished properly.230 Granting scientific data such power over regulatory 
decisions imposes substantial risks on public health.231 
C. The Trial Court Must Convict Despite EPA Inaction 
 The Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s preliminary rul-
ings does not seal the defendants’ fate.232 The case will be tried in the 
Montana District Court “before the [same] Montana-based judge” that 
                                                                                                                      
225 See 40 C.F.R. § 61.01 (2006). 
226 See EPA Action Report, supra note 14, at i (attributing lack of a contaminant-
asbestos NESHAP to “limitations of science, technology, and health effects data”). 
227 See Ann G. Wylie & Jennifer R. Verkouteren, Amphibole Asbestos from Libby, Montana: 
Aspects of Nomenclature, 85 Am. Mineralogist 1329, 1542 (2000). For an in-depth analysis 
of asbestos and its multiple mineral compositions, see the proposed rule offered by MSHA 
in 2005. Mine Safety Health Administration (MSHA), Labor, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,950, 43,952–
53 (proposed July 29, 2005) (discussing the difficulty of classifying asbestos minerals when 
“mineral names are not applied in a uniform manner and are not all consistent with pres-
ently accepted mineralogical nomenclature and definitions”). The proposed rule also 
notes that minerals can transition into different series of asbestos variations, making classi-
fication even more difficult, if not impossible. Id. at 43,953. 
228 Wylie & Verkouteren, supra note 228, at 1542. 
229 Id. 
230 See Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[S]cientific knowl-
edge about the effects of chemicals cannot keep up with the ability of industrial laborato-
ries to create new ones.”); United States v. Grace (Grace II ), 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1132–33 
(D. Mont. 2006) (excluding the government’s evidence because science was incapable of 
distinguishing among the asbestiforms found at the Libby site). See generally Reserve Min-
ing Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (concluding that insufficient scien-
tific data on dangers of taconite tailings counseled against closing the plant). 
231 See Wylie & Verkouteren, supra note 228, at 1542. 
232 Schneider, Asbestos Prosecution, supra note 161, at A7. 
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issued the preliminary rulings in United State v. Grace (Grace II).233 Al-
though evidence previously excluded must be admitted, the trial judge 
retains significant control.234 Therefore, the burden of achieving an 
outcome consistent with the CAA lies with the jury.235 
 Congress enacted the CAA to create a regime through which air 
pollution giving rise to public health risks could be reduced or elimi-
nated.236 Therefore, the CAA, the asbestos NESHAP, and the criminal 
provisions of the CAA should be interpreted in light of these goals.237 If 
these goals take precedence at trial, the following conclusions are inevi-
table: the CAA is a public welfare statute lacking any requirement that 
defendants know they are violating a law,238 and the evidence estab-
lishes that the defendants intentionally released asbestos knowing that 
their actions placed others in imminent danger of bodily harm and 
even death.239 
1. Defendants Need Not Know Their Conduct Violates the CAA 
 Establishing intent, knowledge, and causation in environmental 
criminal matters often poses considerable difficulty.240 Congress recog-
nized these barriers and drafted solutions into the criminal provisions 
                                                                                                                      
233 Id. 
234 Id.; see Grace II, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1132–33 (excluding the government’s sampling 
evidence). 
235 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7412–7413 (2000) (noting that Congress intended 
for the act to promote public health and welfare and to criminally prosecute any per-
son―including a corporate entity―that knowingly released an air pollutant and placed 
another in imminent danger of death or bodily injury). 
236 See id. § 7401(b)(1)–(4). The statute states: 
The purposes of this subchapter are— 
 (1) to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as 
to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its 
population; 
 (2) to initiate and accelerate a national research and development pro-
gram to achieve the prevention and control of air pollution; 
 (3) to provide technical and financial assistance to State and local gov-
ernments in connection with the development and execution of their air pol-
lution prevention and control programs; and 
 (4) to encourage and assist the development and operation of regional air 
pollution prevention and control programs. 
Id. 
237 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280–82 (1943) (illustrating that the 
congressionally intended purpose of the statute was relevant at all stages of analysis). 
238 United States v. Grace (Grace I ), 429 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1228 (D. Mont. 2006). 
239 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 31–32. 
240 See Lazarus, supra note 71, at 2421–22. 
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of all environmental statutes.241 Inherent in these statutes is an under-
standing that the brunt of the hardship should be on those with the 
opportunity to prevent the harm.242 Therefore, in cases arising under 
these statutes, prosecutors need only prove that the defendants acted 
knowingly.243 
 For instance, in United States v. Dotterweich, the Supreme Court up-
held a corporate officer’s conviction for acts in violation of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.244 The Act forbade the transport of 
adulterated goods within commerce.245 The Court’s recognition of the 
Act as a public welfare statute guided its analysis.246 The Court dis-
pensed of the “conventional requirement[s] for criminal conduct,” 
namely, “awareness of . . . wrong doing.”247 Additionally, the Court did 
not find the statute unconstitutionally vague for omitting an exhaustive 
list of employees covered.248 The Court recognized Congress’s intent to 
place “relative hardships” on those with the ability to prevent the harm 
rather than on the innocent public.249 Similarly, in United States v. Mac-
Donald & Watson Waste Oil Co., the court upheld the defendants’ con-
viction over protests of statutory ambiguity because failure to do so 
would have “significantly weaken[ed] . . . protection against the danger 
that most concerned Congress.”250 
 Dotterweich and MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co. support finding 
that the Grace defendants acted in violation of the knowing endan-
                                                                                                                      
241 See id. 
242 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281, 285 (noting the importance of placing the burden of 
adulterated shipments on shippers to “identify their wares”). 
243 Grace I, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 1228. “Public welfare statutes are not to be construed 
narrowly but rather to effectuate the regulatory purpose.” United States v. MacDonald & 
Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 47, 49–50 (1st Cir. 1991). 
244 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281. 
245 Id. at 278. 
246 See id. at 280 (noting that the clause could “not be read in isolation” from its pur-
pose “to keep impure and adulterated food and drugs out of the channels of commerce”). 
247 Id. at 281. 
248 Id. at 285. “To attempt a formula embracing the variety of conduct whereby persons 
may responsibly contribute in furtherance of a transaction forbidden by [the] Act” would 
be an exercise in futility. Id. “In such matters, the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guid-
ance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries must be trusted.” Id. 
249 Id. at 285. 
250 United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 47 (1st Cir. 1991). 
In Watson Waste Oil Co., the defendants contended that their actions fell beyond the pur-
view of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) because the facility was not 
entirely without a RCRA hazardous waste permit. Id. at 48. The court, in contrast, noted 
that the statute was violated when transportation of hazardous waste does not comply with 
RCRA permit conditions. Id. at 49. 
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germent provision.251 Defendants’ guilt is not contingent on their 
awareness of § 7413(c)(5).252 Thus, their constitutional rights are not 
violated by admitting evidence of asbestos particles that are unlisted in 
CAA.253 Such a requirement improperly implies that knowledge of the 
statute is an element of the knowing endangerment claim.254 
 Further, this case―distinguishable from Adamo Wrecking Co. v. 
United States―does not implicate defendants’ due process rights.255 De-
fendant Adamo was indicted under § 7412(c)(1)(b) of the CAA.256 The 
Supreme Court’s analysis focused on whether the provision constituted 
an emissions standard or a “technique to be utilized in achieving” emis-
sions standards.257 After examining the regulatory scheme in its totality, 
the Court held that the regulation was not an emissions standard, and 
found it doubtful that Congress intended for violators to face criminal 
liability.258 This doubt led the Court to invoke the principle of lenity.259 
Unlike the defendant in Adamo, Grace and its officials are not facing 
penalties under a demolition standard or work practice standard, or a 
regulation that is inconclusive as to whether criminal penalties should 
attach.260 In contrast, the knowing release of asbestos that places an-
                                                                                                                      
251 Compare Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280 (noting that the central purpose of an act 
should “infuse” its construction), with Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d at 49 (refusing to nar-
rowly construe RCRA’s permit requirement). Because the CAA is a public welfare statute, 
the analysis in Dotterweich is instructive. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280, 284. 
252 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280. 
253 See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285; United States v. Grace (Grace II ), 455 F. Supp. 2d 
1122, 1132–33 (D. Mont. 2006). 
254 See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280, 284 (noting that the lower court’s ruling exempting 
certain employees disregards the “central purpose of the act” and advising against reading 
any portion of a statute in isolation from the statutory purpose or scheme); see also Laza-
rus, supra note 71, at 2424 (noting the distinguishing features of environmental crime 
leading Congress to abandon the knowledge requirement). 
255 See Adamo Wrecking Co.v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 278–79 (1978). A notable 
difference between the case at hand and Adamo is that the defendant in Adamo was not 
accused of violating an emissions standard. Id. at 289. 
256 See id. at 277. 
257 Id. at 278–79. 
258 Id. at 284–85. 
259 Id. 
 In sum, a survey of the totality of the statutory scheme does not compel 
agreement with the Government’s contention that Congress intended that 
the Administrator’s designation of a regulation as an emission standard 
should be conclusive in a criminal prosecution. At the very least, it may be 
said that the issue is subject to some doubt. 
Id. 
260 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5) (2000); Adamo, 434 U.S. at 284–85. 
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other in imminent danger of death or bodily harm is precisely the con-
duct that Congress intended to criminalize in the CAA.261 
2. The Evidence Supports Conviction Under § 7413(c)(5) 
 The knowing endangerment offense requires proving that the de-
fendant knowingly placed another in imminent danger of death or seri-
ous harm by intentionally releasing a HAP, or extremely hazardous sub-
stance.262 The record supports the conclusion that Grace knew the 
effects of its vermiculite-mining activity.263 For instance, tests conducted 
by Grace placed the company on notice that its mining activity emitted 
asbestos, that its products emitted asbestos, and that its employees were 
increasingly prone to cancer-related abnormalities.264 Further, the de-
fendants had “specialized knowledge” of industrial chemicals, and ex-
pertise in dealing with the relevant regulations, including the Chemical 
Abstracts Service (CAS) Registry, a database of chemical information.265 
According to the government’s appellate brief, Grace, and the experts 
the company retained, consistently referred to the Libby asbestos as 
tremolite.266 Therefore, Grace’s specialized knowledge distinguishes it 
from the common person reading a NESHAP and casts doubt on any 
due process concerns raised by the district court and the defense.267 In 
light of the defendants’ knowledge, continuous operation of the mine 
                                                                                                                      
261 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5). Further, in United States v. Borowski, the court invoked 
the lenity principle in applying the Clean Water Act because the defendants’ conduct was 
not at odds with the Act’s purpose. 977 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1992). The court found that, 
although the defendants knowingly endangered employees, the Act aimed to prevent dis-
charges into publicly owned treatment works. Id. at 31–32. Unlike in Borowski, knowingly 
endangering employees cannot be distinguished from knowingly endangering the public 
when dealing with an airborne hazardous substance. See id. 
262 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5); Mandiberg & Smith, supra note 61, at 132. 
263 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 7. 
264 Id. at 7–8. 
265 United States v. Grace (Grace III ), 504 F.3d 745, 755 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007); Brief of 
Appellant, supra note 5, at 31. Notably, the defendants never dispute their specialized 
knowledge; rather, they assert that having specialized knowledge supports their position. 
See Appellees’ Joint Response Brief, supra note 5, at 41–42 (“[A]assuming such knowledge, 
the more one knows about the regulatory framework for asbestos under the Clean Air Act 
and . . . the CAS Registry, the less likely one would be to conclude that the reference to 
‘asbestos’ in § 7412(b)(1) includes winchite and richterite.”). 
266 Appellees Joint Response Brief, supra note 5, at 42. 
267 Id. The court noted that a defendant’s due process rights are violated when the 
court “appl[ies] a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the stat-
ute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope.” Id. However, 
“whether some hypothetical person might find it difficult to determine what substances 
fall within the CAS Registry’s definition of asbestos, it is clear that the defendants were not 
in such a position.” Id. at 31–32. 
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violated the knowing endangerment provision and criminal penalties 
should be imposed.268 Much more is at stake than justice for Libby resi-
dents if an acquittal of these defendants becomes precedent for future 
cases.269 
Conclusion 
 Without a doubt, responsibility for the Libby debacle should fall 
on two bad actors: EPA for abdicating its regulatory duties and the 
Grace defendants for knowingly releasing asbestos with knowledge of 
the resulting threat to human life.270 EPA inaction with regard to con-
taminant asbestos in Libby is inexcusable. However, the defendants’ 
actions are, at least, as appalling. Therefore, while an acquittal might 
humiliate EPA into regulatory efforts, it would also obstruct the goals 
of environmental criminal law and leave the Libby community with-
out an appropriate remedy. 
 Perhaps EPA will issue regulations in the near future. If, however, 
the it does not, courts must not hesitate to hold defendants accountable 
under § 7413(c)(5). Doing so―contrary to defendants’ argu-
ment―does not blur the line between what does and does not consti-
tute a “knowing endangerment” violation.271 Penalizing Grace defen-
dants, and similarly situated violators under § 7413(c)(5), does not run 
contrary to any principle of justice.272 The defendants knew that their 
actions were causing deaths, yet they attempted to conceal the truth and 
people continued to die.273 At this very moment, someone in Libby may 
be experiencing the initial symptoms of an asbestos-related disease due 
to the latency period following exposure.274 A guilty verdict will not be 
                                                                                                                      
268 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5) (2000); Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 7–9. 
269 See Schneider, Asbestos Prosecution, supra note 161, at A7. 
270 The parties are quite effective in shifting blame to the other side. See, e.g., Appel-
lee’s Joint Response Brief, supra note 5, at 8–9 (suggesting the defendants are simply scape-
goats for EPA failure). “The 1999 newspaper articles in effect accused the EPA of failing to 
follow up on such information. . . . Whether or not such accusations were justified, this 
criminal prosecution provides the Government a convenient excuse—a conspiracy among 
the defendants—for the Government’s own perceived failure to act in Libby.” Id. 
271 See Appellees’ Joint Response Brief, supra note 5, at 2. 
272 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5); Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 29–30. 
273 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 10–11; Schneider, Left to Die, supra note 7, at 
A4. 
274 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 10. “[M]ore victims are expected to be dis-
covered in the years to come due to the long delay that frequently occurs between expo-
sure and the manifestation of symptoms.” Id. In fact, since initiating its case, the govern-
ment has lost several key witnesses to deaths caused by asbestos-related disease, including 
one of the defendants. Schneider, Asbestos Prosecution, supra note 161, at A7. 
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the result of “intense passions and political pressures.”275 To the con-
trary, holding the Grace defendants criminally responsible will give 
§ 7413(c)(5) its congressionally intended effect. 
                                                                                                                      
275 See Appellees’ Joint Response Brief, supra note 5, at 2. 
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